Transnational corporate bribery is complexly organised at a multi-jurisdictional level. However, enforcement remains at the local, national level where investigators and prosecutors are pressured to respond using frameworks for enforcement created by intergovernmental organisations. These legal frameworks are incorporated into national laws which results in legal convergence between jurisdictions but the 'functional equivalence' approach of intergovernmental organisations enables divergence in enforcement practices. This article analyses two theoretically comparable anti-corruption enforcement systems, those of the UK and Germany, to evidence an understanding of policy responses at the operational level. Irrespective of the enforcement system implemented (centralised or decentralised, use of corporate criminal liability or not, amongst other dimensions), enforcement faces significant structural, legal, procedural, evidential and financial obstacles, even where will to enforce the law is high. Consequently, criminal law enforcement is currently implausible.
Introduction
Large-scale investigations involving multi-national corporations (MNCs) such as the BAE Systems and Siemens bribery scandals demonstrate how large commercial enterprises may be the subject of allegations of bribing overseas public officials to further or maintain their business interests. 1 For example, BAE Systems are (and have been) under investigation for paying bribes to the Czech Republic, Romania, Qatar, Chile, Tanzania and most notably Saudi Arabia to secure sales of their defence equipment. Some would accept that as the cost of development or the unavoidable interdependence between licit and illicit commerce in 'grey' markets; others would argue that corruption and bribery have devastating consequences, in particular for developing countries where much corporate bribery is directed -such activities may cause serious political, economic, social and environmental harms 2 such as diminished economic development and growth, increased social inequality, and distrust of government (Delaney, 2007: 419) as well as inefficient government contracting and privatisations, use of delays and red tape to induce payoffs, inefficient use of corrupt payments, inequities in reference to the distribution of gains and losses, damaged political legitimacy, and slowed growth whereby the benefits of development are distributed unequally (Rose-Ackermann, 1997: 42-46) . These moral and socio-economic harms have led concerned parties to focus on law enforcement and other control mechanisms. But criminal justice mechanisms have not proven to be easy. Council of Europe) level Conventions provide anti-corruption frameworks within which to tackle these crimes -these often incorporate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms (for example, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) and the OECD Working Group on Bribery) to review the efficacy of national anti-bribery and corruption policies and enforcement practices, though serious measurement and indeed conceptual issues remain.
However, implementing international frameworks at the national level is not straightforward. For example, while countries sign and ratify such international frameworks, some jurisdictions often possess insufficient infrastructures and resources to enforce them (Shover and Hochstetler, 2006: 107) . State corruption may also reduce enforcement while powerful nations may have the ability to influence the creation of international treaties and therefore protect their business activities by resisting criminalisation or refusing to ratify treaties (Michalowski and Bitten, 2005) . As business transactions become more transnational in nature, increased opportunities for white-collar crimes and the possibility of externalising risk have been created -the global marketplace also intensifies the impacts of white-collar crimes and risky transactions as we have seen most recently with the global 4 economic crisis and subprime mortgage lending (Gibbs et al., 2010: 544) . There is no widely accepted nor effective transnational law making and law enforcement body or mechanismin other words, business becomes global but controllers are generally constrained by divergent domestic rules and limited jurisdiction (Passas, 1999: 400; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000) . It is here that a key contradiction becomes evident: in short, national authorities are pressured to respond to trans-national corporate bribery using inter-national frameworks for enforcement that are distanced from context and the cultural and internal/external pressures faced at the operational level.
These issues raise significant questions: To what extent are national enforcement regimes able to implement the requirements of international frameworks? What are the differences and similarities in the challenges and obstacles faced in different jurisdictions?
Due to several key intellectual similarities and differences, comparative analysis of the UK and Germany is particularly suitable for understanding the impact of international frameworks for enforcement and the limits and strengths of national enforcement frameworks. 3 First, both the UK and Germany are key economic players, both being members of the G8 and both having the largest share of world exports in the EU. (This is significant given the focus on transnational corruption). Second, since the introduction of the OECD Convention, Germany has concluded significantly more cases than the UK, although these enforcement rates have become more similar in the last three years. Third, the anti-corruption enforcement systems of the two jurisdictions differ in structure. The UK may be considered a centralised system while the German system is decentralised. Fourth, corporate criminal liability exists in the UK but not in Germany.
The empirical insights and quotes in this article are taken from data collected as part of the author's ESRC funded doctoral research that was completed in 2012. Bundesländer were approached and acted as gatekeepers to prosecutorial and investigatory agencies and departments. Interviews with those at the operational and strategic levels were carried out. Interviews were also conducted with representatives of two intergovernmental organisations and a leading non-governmental organisation that are highly influential in the response to transnational corporate corruption and bribery. UK and German lawyers with extensive prosecutorial/defence experience of white-collar crimes and country specific experts were also interviewed along with extensive bilingual document analysis. Interviews discussed the policy responses in the two jurisdictions and at the international level with specific focus on detection, investigation, prosecution and prevention and their location within the cultural, institutional and legal contexts of both countries.
The article initially analyses the most significant international enforcement frameworks. Here the OECD and UN Conventions are analysed and their impact at the national level discussed -although much convergence is evident (even though Germany is yet to ratify the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) -see below), significant differences remain. These reflect the 'functional equivalence' approach adopted by 6 intergovernmental organisations. However, common difficulties are faced: nation-states attempting to regulate the behaviour of transnational corporations often face a host of political concerns and economic interests (Rothe, 2010: 561; Snider and Bittle, 2011) . And as demonstrated here, there are significant structural, legal, evidential, procedural and financial obstacles to implementing international frameworks for enforcement, even when motivation to enforce is high. Consequently, full criminal law enforcement is currently implausible.
International anti-bribery frameworks
Nation-states strive to promote their own economic and corporate interests. 
Germany

11
The Anti-Corruption Act 1997 was the last measure to improve Germany's criminal law that was solely initiated by German political actors (Wolf, 2006: 785) . This Act formulated sections 331 -338 of the German Criminal Code (GCC). Anti-bribery and corruption legislation is further supplemented by the EU Anti-Bribery Act and the Act on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 1998 -this latter Act satisfies the requirements of the OECD Convention. The Bundestag has largely confined its implementation legislation to the minimum requirements of the respective international legal instruments, a policy that has led to legal inconsistencies (Wolf, 2006: 789) . Legal convergence 12 The impact of pressuring nation-states to implement international frameworks for enforcement has led to convergence and harmonisation of key legal provisions. Germany has yet to ratify the UNCAC but this relates to the requirement for the criminalisation of 'domestic bribery', which has attracted opposition from German politicians. 5 German authorities might regard it as consistent to respond to international obligations, but to regard their domestic legislation as their own business alone. Despite non-ratification, Germany nonetheless meets all the foreign bribery requirements of the UNCAC due to the similar requirements of the ratified OECD Convention. German laws therefore incorporate analogous provisions to that of the UK where ratification of UNCAC has taken place. For example, active and passive bribery, bribery of foreign officials, extraterritorial reach, amongst others, are all evident. In this sense, non-ratification of the UNCAC in Germany has not made any significant difference to the policy response and enforcement context when contrasted with the UK, although the 'functional equivalence' approach of the OECD Convention does enable significant differences to remain between the UK and Germany in the legal frameworks. However, non-ratification of the UNCAC may create difficulties in mutual legal assistance should German authorities require cooperation with those jurisdictions that have not ratified the OECD Convention.
Enforcing the law
The particular nature of transnational corporate bribery poses identical problems to both jurisdictions. Transnational corporate bribery is clandestine and frequently involves consenting actors whereby both parties benefit from the corrupt transaction. The lack of identifiable consequences (e.g. no direct victims or harms), the 'invisibility' of actors, their 13 relations and transactions due to the ambiguous nature of bribes (e.g. exchange of legitimate services) and the knowledge and power problems of the state ensuring corporate subsystems and their transactions remain difficult to access and understand (see Mayntz, 1993; Gill, 2002) , are common characteristics of the problem in the UK and Germany. The following section evidences how responding to such a complex crime encounters structural, legal, evidential, procedural and financial obstacles and thus influences the ability of nationstates to enforce the international frameworks they have been pressured into implementing, even when resources and political will may be evident.
Structural: centralised vs. decentralised enforcement systems
Two diverse enforcement systems exist in the UK (centralised) and Germany (decentralised) which reflects geographical, historical and cultural factors but both reflect traditional 'command and control' regulatory regimes (see Baldwin and Cave, 1999 There are strengths and limitations of both systems. The UK's centralised model enables a more consistent and coordinated regulatory approach. However, the SFO has modest personnel and funding for an agency with national jurisdiction and therefore applies discretionary 'acceptance criteria' to all cases from the pre-investigation stage. 8 This results
in only large, complex cases being taken on -it has never been the case in England that the authorities are obliged to prosecute all the offences that come to their attention (Spencer, 2002: 161) . In Germany, a more rigid legal framework exists which stipulates that prosecution of an offence is mandatory for public prosecutors and investigations must be commenced when sufficient suspicion arises (Juy-Birmann, 2002 
Legal: corporate criminal liability
Corporate criminal liability determines whether 'legal persons' (that is, corporations) can be prosecuted under the criminal law in the same way that 'natural persons' (individual persons) can be prosecuted although there is often some relationship between the two:
[w]hen offences by individuals occur in a corporate context, it may be because the company's policies, culture and ethos authorize, encourage, condone or tolerate the illegal behaviour…That the individual was committing the offence on behalf of a company provides a handy rationalization for the crime.' (Gobert, 2011: 154) Corporate criminal liability in the UK has traditionally required courts to locate the corporate mind for purposes of assessing mens rea. English judges found the 'company's mind' in the mind of persons who could be 'identified' with the company for legal purposes (Gobert and Punch, 2003: 38) . This historical focus on the individual has caused the legal mind to struggle with locating mens rea in an aggregate entity (Punch, 2011: 111) . This has remained a key difficulty in the UK: The difficulty in locating the 'controlling mind' remains for the general offences of active and passive bribery (this influences the increased use of civil approaches in the UK).
However, under the corporate offence of 'failure to prevent bribery' (section 7 UKBA) a corporation can also be held criminally liable for acts of bribery by its associated persons (employees, subsidiaries, intermediaries, sales agents, and so on) that are carried out on behalf of the corporation. Previous to the UKBA, and as above, corporations could only be held criminally liable if it could be proved that the 'corporate mind' (i.e. a board member or executive) had a direct role in the bribery. However should the UK corporation have 'adequate' anti-bribery procedures, policies and cultures in place, this may provide a legal defence to prosecution. The inclusion of a form of strict liability into the UKBA reflects the argument that '[t]he organization often provides the motive, opportunity and means; it is the scene of crime; and the offences can be committed across time and in diverse locations depending on the structure of the company' (Punch, 2011: 110) 
Evidential: transnational investigations
Evidential difficulties are most notable in two ways: (i) the burden of proof when attempting to criminally prosecute a corporation and (ii) obtaining evidence from other jurisdictions. A 20 recent example of these difficulties in the UK can be seen in the case involving Oxford Publishing Ltd (OPL), a wholly owned subsidiary of Oxford University Press (OUP). OPL received sums generated through corrupt behaviour in Kenya and Tanzania and on 3 July 2012 were given a Civil Recovery Order. The rationale for not pursuing criminal prosecution were that (i) key material obtained through the investigation was not in an evidentially admissible format for a criminal prosecution and that (ii) witnesses in any such prosecution would be in overseas jurisdictions and are considered unlikely to assist or co-operate with a criminal investigation in the UK. only cooperating via formal written requests rather than giving prior information via a simple telephone call, as it goes against their legal system based on Commissions Rogatoires between judicial authorities, not the police. In another case, the French authorities complained that a search conducted for them in the UK was of no use because all the UK 23 authority had done was send them the original documents that were confiscated -as no investigator's report was attached outlining the nature of the MLA request, they were not able to use it under their system. This can make cooperation long-winded despite speed being of paramount importance in some cases. However, one UK investigator suggested that in the view of other European countries, the UK does not have a good reputation for MLA -a view substantiated by some German prosecutors and investigators (See also Levi (1987) showing this is not a recent phenomenon). Even more difficult is cooperation with those countries that have no anti-bribery and corruption authorities or no political will to assist. These factors reinforce limited enforcement models at the national level and the difficulties in implementing international frameworks for enforcement. However, recent global settlements between the UK and the US, and between Germany and the US, have demonstrated how MLA can work effectively and attempt to address this transnational difficulty.
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Procedural: prosecution policy
Conducting transnational investigations and prosecutions is resource intensive. Criminal prosecution is extremely expensive and time-consuming due to the high costs of investigation to meet the substantial evidential and procedural requirements (as above), due to the costs of recruiting external counsel and prosecutors for large complex cases, and due to the ability of corporations to employ technical and expert legal teams to defend them all of which lower the likelihood of conviction. Conversely, civil solutions are more cost effective, with corporations often covering the costs of investigation. Civil solutions enable the prosecutorial authorities to conclude an increased number of cases as there is no 24 requirement to prove a criminal offence and the burden of proof is lower therefore increasing the likelihood of a successful outcome. This in turn enables the authorities to extend their reach. Civil solutions to this can take several forms: financial settlements and fines; restitution via Civil Recovery Orders that include the amount of the unlawful property (for example, often profits from contracts won), and investigatory and prosecutorial costs.
In relation to the demand for resources and the use of civil solutions for overseas bribery cases, one UK prosecutor stated:
…that doesn't mean that they are any less criminal [companies that bribe compared to 'conventional criminals'], it just means that you are trying to bring them to justice in a way that doesn't sap all of your resource because obviously we are having our budgets cut quite drastically. So it is an extremely efficient way if they come to you and report and then correct the problem which is part of the solution, isn't it. (Interview with UK prosecutor)
In the current economic climate, particularly in the UK, available resources are influencing the adoption of more cost-effective approaches. The SFO has had its budget reduced in recent years. In Germany, resources are more widely available but the decentralised system results in some prosecutors being better equipped than others. Noncriminal approaches may also be preferred due to the risk of debarment under the abovementioned EU Directive that requires mandatory debarment of any corporation found guilty of a corruption offence. The financial consequences of debarment to a country's economy can be significant, causing tension for states between considering national economic interest and ensuring the Rule of Law.
Thus, UK and German investigators and prosecutors, as well as representatives of intergovernmental organisations, accept the reality of financial, evidential and procedural 25 restraints but this shift towards civil solutions is also ideological and symbolic as these actors suggest that much corporate, economic crime requires negotiation and persuasion rather than criminal prosecution as part of a more dynamic approach. For example, new regulatory models include 'responsive regulation' (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992) , 'smart regulation' (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998) , problem-solving regulation (Sparrow, 2008) , 'metaregulation' (Parker, 2002) , market based regulation (Gill, 2000; Edwards and Gill, 2002) , the 'governance triangle' (Abbott and Snidal, 2006) , 'regulatory capitalism' (Braithwaite, 2008) and 'really responsive risk-based regulation' (Black and Baldwin, 2010) while there has been recent focus on regulators as 'sociological citizens' (Silbey et al., 2009; Silbey, 2011) .
Multiple common themes can be seen throughout these approaches. For example, the need for a varied set of sanctions and strategies including both enforcement and self-regulatory mechanisms, the necessity of 'negotiated relationships' between the regulators and regulatees, the reflexivity, responsiveness and agency of the regulators, and the involvement of non-state actors and agencies. As Haines notes:
This literature places the regulator within a broad governance framework where the enforcement of rules within narrow prescriptive frameworks is eschewed in preference for policy mixes, combining instruments, third-party actors, and enforcement regimes that collectively can both "push" and "pull" (Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998: 259) regulatees into a reflexive appreciation of the goals the regulator wants to achieve and lead them to act in a diligent manner to bring the goals to fruition' (Haines, 2011: 118-119) In line with these new regulatory models, innovative and parsimonious approaches have emerged within the regulatory landscape of transnational corporate bribery. 'Hybrid mechanisms' such as the use of self-reporting, self-cleaning 13 2011: 15) . Shifts towards non-criminal alternatives may also reduce the stigma associated with such criminal behaviour and fail to satisfy public demand for social fairness and retribution, creating an image of such offences as 'mala prohibita' rather than 'mala in se'.
Implications for the policy response
The complex organisation of corporate bribery presents obstacles to prosecution and conviction, rendering criminal law enforcement implausible in the current control landscape -the difficulties when criminally prosecuting corporations, the shift towards civil settlements and negotiation, the need to use resources effectively, the evidential burdens of transnational investigations, etc. inhibit the policy response of the UK and Germany to address transnational bribery. Although some regulation is possible, the enforcement capacities of responsible agencies and actors cannot meet even the most conservative estimate of the 'need' or 'demand' for prosecutions, even more so in times of austerity.
Understanding these limitations may assist policymakers, legislators and agents of control in improving current practices. Granted that there may be a demand for punishing bribery as just deserts and social fairness, irrespective of the deterrent impact, other approaches are possible either as substitutes or as supplements. Shifting analytical focus onto the modus operandi of how those incidents of bribery (that do come to the attention of the authorities and are successfully prosecuted) have been organised and onto the 28 particular technical and social characteristics and relations of transnational bribery would supplement more reactive policies. For example, white-collar crime reduction has been analysed through an 'opportunity perspective' approach, the tools of which are predominantly situational crime prevention, routine activities theory and crime pattern theory (see Benson et al., 2009; Benson and Simpson, 2009 Prevention is something that the public prosecutor doesn't do. We only operate in terms of repression…By law we are explicitly a prosecutorial authority. We have no mandate for prevention. in raids, but there is currently no obvious prevention mechanism or legislative powers for so doing in advance of criminal complaints.
Conclusion
International frameworks for enforcement pressure nation-states to sign and ratify their requirements leading to implementation at the national level. Comparison of two theoretically comparable anti-corruption systems, the UK and Germany, enables significant insights into the impact of these international legal frameworks at the national level. First, such frameworks lead to legal convergence at the national level in relation to specific provisions accounting for bribery of foreign officials. Thus, harmonisation of the law is evident (despite Germany not having ratified the UNCAC). However, significant differences remain in these jurisdictions. Second, the enforcement of such legal frameworks at the operational level is the key issue. Whether centralised or decentralised and irrespective of other differing characteristics (for example, corporate criminal liability) enforcement systems at the national level face significant difficulties. The moral and socio-economic harms of corruption have led concerned parties to focus on law enforcement and other control mechanisms but criminal justice mechanisms have not proven to be easy, even when motivation to enforce is high. The law provides a normative framework within which 32 certain activities have been condemned. The criminal law framework therefore remains significant for prosecutors for its symbolic and (potentially) deterrent effect in order for the state (i) to negotiate regulation with corporations and (ii) to demonstrate to the various publics at the national, regional and international levels that it is actively enforcing the law against corporations that bribe overseas.
Law enforcement, however, faces structural, legal, evidential, procedural and financial obstacles. The 'functional equivalence' approach of intergovernmental organisations enables diversity in the 'means' adopted providing the 'goals' (in other words, the successful conclusion of bribery cases) are met. This can be seen in relation to corporate criminal liability that is legally available in the UK but not in Germany. That said, other obstacles (for example, high burden of proof and financial costs of criminal prosecution) and/or ideologies (for example, regulatory approaches favouring compliance and persuasion rather than prosecution of corporations) have led to convergence in the regulatory approaches of these two jurisdictions. For example, corporations bribing overseas are likely to be able to negotiate civil solutions (to criminal behaviours) that incorporate financial penalties and more innovative mechanisms such as self-cleaning, monitoring and introducing adequate compliance systems to reduce the likelihood of future bribery. Thus, responding to transnational corporate bribery using international frameworks for enforcement, while legally sound, is not entirely practicable as difficulties emerge that hinder the full use of these legal provisions.
